



Building a PMU that withstands spoofing using an internal atomic clock



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http://www.swri.org/4org/d10/comm/NetCent.htm



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


Agenda

- 1. PMU Overview
 - **➤**Clock Synchronization
 - ➤ GPS Vulnerabilities
- 2. PMU Hardware Setup
 - >Test Results
- 3. Solutions
 - >Test Results




Clock Synchronization





GPS Vulnerabilities






What Does This Mean?

- Jamming/Spoofing GPS is <u>EASY</u>
- GPS is not likely to change
- We want to Protect GPS
 - But,
 - Protecting RF is an <u>EXPENSIVE</u> option
 - The RF Attack Surface is LARGE
 - Many attacks have not been shown <u>YET</u>








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
SwRI PMU Test Setup



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Attack Test Results






What We Have Done

Options: Algorithms and/or Hardware

	Spoof Detection	Max Withstand (Hold-off)	Cost
Option 1: Anomaly Detection Algorithm	Some fast attacks	10's of Seconds	\$
Option 2: Standard Clock Reference	All attacks	Minutes	\$\$
Option 3: Precise Clock Reference	All attacks	Days	\$\$\$
-	•	•	
-	•	•	
	•	•	



Slow Spoof vs. Option 3





Key Takeaways

- No silver bullet to defend from GPS attacks
- GPS is widely used from financial institutions to global navigation and time synchronization, and it is unlikely to change in the near future (\$\$\$\$).
- Detecting attacks solely based on RF analysis (time averaging, etc.) has limited utility.
- FPGA Technology can be used to constantly monitor in real-time the "Quality" of various time sources and select the one that is most appropriate at any given time.





THANK YOU!



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