

## Pacific Southwest Disturbance September 8, 2011

NASPI Working Group Meeting – Denver, CO June 6, 2012





- We heard there was a blackout in Southern California
- ...and that the San Onofre plant was tripped...
- ...and then we heard that a switching error was the cause of the whole thing...
- Of course, we didn't believe it was that simple!






# Initial Analysis (overnight)







#### CAISO Freq/ACE 1635-1705 MST






#### 1-Min. CAISO Freq. 1500-0530 MST






### System Separation & SONGS Trip



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## Joint NERC-FERC Event Analysis Inquiry





- Announced September 9, 2012
- Teams formed comprising over 30 senior technical staff of FERC and NERC, plus several NERC contractors and industry subject matter experts
- Multiple meetings and exchanges with affected entities to gather facts
- Team products combined into final report
- Outreach sessions to gain feedback on draft findings and recommendations



## Inquiry Teams

- Data Requests/Management
- Sequence of Events
- Modeling/Simulation
- Cause Analysis/Human Performance
- Operations Tools/ SCADA/EMS
- Frequency Analysis
- System Planning/Design
- Equipment Performance/System Protection
- Restoration



## Initial FNet Analysis




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### **FNET FDR Locations**






### **25 Minutes of Frequency**






#### **Event A**






### **Event A Detail**






#### **Event B**






#### **Event C**





#### **Event D**





- The frequency shows four main events
  - A. The initial **separation** around **22:27:39 (UTC)**, with a 'slow' frequency dip of about -30 mHz over about 25 seconds
  - B. A frequency **ramp** beginning around **22:32:10** increasing frequency +30 mHz over about 15 seconds
  - C. A frequency **drop** around **22:37:55** of over -40 mHz (B-A) over about 12 seconds
  - D. A frequency jump around 22:38:21 of over +150 mHz
     (C-A) in less than 5 seconds, settling at around +80 mHz
     (B-A) in about 20 seconds



# Sequence of Events





- Over 30 'major' element operations over the course of 11 minutes
  - Line and transformer trips
  - Generator trips and runback
  - Load shedding
  - Over 50 additional 'minor' operations such as capacitor and reactor switching
- Over 6 GB of data of different qualities and resolution
  - Operator logs, PI historian, SCADA, PMU, DFR, relay



### **SOE Process**

- Reported event times were entered in a database
  - Facilitated slicing & dicing by event and element type
  - Tracked reported time vs. verified time and status

- Event were categorized
  - Unqualified
  - Non-essential
  - Information
  - Event
  - Minor Event
  - Human Action
  - System Condition
  - Restoration

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### **SOE** Database


ID		urceFileName	Form ConOQ 201			Event Time	15:28:17.265
85	IID Di	sturbance Data	Form Sep08-201	L1-IID.		Event fille	15.28.17.205
Event							
Coachella Valley 230/92kV Bank #1 No Longer Carrying Load							
			Phase-Initia	ating Event	? InfoLevel	3 <b>v</b> Event	Type Transform 🗸
DetailedEvent							
Coachella Valley 230kV KSNO breaker open. This breaker is a High side breaker on the 230kV Ring Bus							
arrangement. The other high side H1O breaker was opened at 15:28:17.264, resulting in the disconnection of							
Bank #1. The overcurrent tripping relay (51) recorded 843 A on the 230 kV winding at the time of trip.							
	Start	Stop 1	Time Zone				
Raw	15:28:17	F	PDT 🗸		WasReconcile		
Agreed	15:28:17		PDT 🗸	Confirmed within 0.1 seconds by Devers 230kV PMU			
ABICCU	voltage and frequency.						
	Agreed ms						
265 TimeQuality NIST 🗸							
<sup>™</sup> Reconciled?							
Notes Comments							
From Bus	# 210	007 To Bus #	21008	Station (	Coachella Valle	e Circuit #	1
	COACHEL	V	COACHELV			MVAR	
	230		92				L



- The database was reviewed collectively by the SOE team
  - What caused the event?
  - Does the sequence make sense?
  - Does the data support the cause?
  - Can the timing be verified?
- These questions may be difficult to answer when multiple events occur near-simultaneously
- Using PMU data, we were able to verify the SOE in 6 total meeting days




### Simplified System Diagram



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### Phase 1 – Pre-Disturbance



- Hot, shoulder season day; some generation and transmission outages
- High loading on some key facilities: H-NG at 78% of normal rating; CV transformers at 83%
- 44 minutes before loss of H-NG, IID's RTCA results showed loss of CV-1 transformer would load CV-2 transformer above its relay trip point
- 15:27:39: APS technician skipped a critical step in isolating the series capacitor bank at North Gila substation; H-NG trips

Wildlife Refuge


Desierto de Altar

Reserva de la

Organ Ripe Cactus National Monument




### Phase 2 – Trip of H-NG 500 kV




- H-NG 500 kV trips at 15:27:39
- APS tells WECC RC line expected to be restored quickly
- H-NG flow redistributes: 77% to SCE-SDGE (Path 44); remainder to IID, and WALC
- CV transformers immediately overloaded above relay settings
- Path 44 at 5,900 amps; 8,000 amp limit on SONGS separation scheme

NERCInitiating Event – Voltage DivergenceNORTH AMERICAN ELECTRICHassayampa – North Gila 500 kV Trip




#### NERC NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION HASS. – N. GIIA 500 kV Line Trip






#### Phase 3 – Trip of CV Transformers








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### Phase 4 – Ramon Xfmr Trip




- 15:32:10 Ramon 230/92kV transformer trips on overload relay
- 15:32:13 Blythe-Niland
   161kV line trips
- 15:32:15 Niland CV 161kV line trips
- IID undervoltage load shedding; loss of generation and 92 kV transmission lines
- Severe low voltage in WALC
   161 kV system
- Loading on Path 44 increases to 7,800 amps; settles at 7,200 amps


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### **Ramon Transformer Trip**



#### Voltage in Northern IID 92 kV System




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


## Blythe 161 kV Voltage





### Phase 5 – Yuma Separates




- Yuma AZ Separates from IID and WALC when Gila and Yucca transformers trip
- Yuma load pocket isolated on single tie to SDG&E
- Loading on Path 44 increases to 7,400 amps after Gila transformer trip; to 7,800 amps after Yucca transformers and generator trip

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
Organ Ripe Cactus National Monument



#### **Yuma Separation**












### Phase 6 – High-Speed Cascade















### SONGS Sep. Frequency Impacts








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## Phase 7 – S CA Separates



- Yuma island separates from SDG&E when IV-NG 500 kV trips on underfrequency
- APS UFLS operates, but insufficient to stabilize load
- Yuma load pocket collapses

Avondale

Sonoran

esert Nationa

Buckeye


Organ Ripe Cactus

National Monument

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## **UFLS** Operations in the Island




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
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# NERC


### Phase 7 – CFE Separates







#### NERC NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC Reliability corporation Phase 7 – Complete Blackout






## Use of PMUs in EA






#### **2003 Blackout Simulations**






### **PMU Data from SONGS**





#### **7** Phases of Event

South of SONGS - Calculated Phase Current








## Sequence of Events Analysis with PMUs



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
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### **Critical PMU Locations**






### Phase 4 Example






#### Phase 5 Example






### Phase 6 Example






#### **Devers SVC Output**





### **Capacitor Switching**

SCE SONGS/Devers Voltage












### **Simulation vs. Actual Flows**



——Simulated ——Actual (PMU)






### Angular Separation Teaser




### **Simulated Phase Angles**



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### **PMU Measured Phase Angles**



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## Questions?



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