

Operational Modeling and Model Inputs


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NASPI Model Validation Workshop
July 11, 2013

RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY




- If something is not modeled, how can you predict system behavior or the interaction of components?
- Bad modeling can give a false sense of security
- Bad Modeling → Bad Decisions
 - Planning – wasted money
 - Operations – unknowingly operating in insecure states

Real event



Dynamic simulations




No confidence in dynamic database

- Aggressive testing of generating units
 - 80% of units directly tested
- Validation by Observation adopted
- System probing testing
 - Pacific DC Tie (PDCI) signal injection (ongoing process)
 - Chief Joseph Braking Resistor (1,400 MW) insertion
- Validation by system disturbance PMU recordings
 - Ongoing for significant system events
- Identified 12 discreet inter-area oscillatory modes
 - Identified mode shapes and participating generators
 - Tuned generator controls and Power System Stabilizers

WECC Confidence today

- *grid frequency*

Malin Frequency, June 14 2004 West Wing event




 *Real event*

 *Simulations*


System simulations of June 14, 2004

- *COI power*


COI Power, June 14 2004 West Wing Disturbance




*Highlighted in December 2011 FERC report
“...simulation predicted significantly greater frequency response than was, in fact, recorded by monitoring equipment.”*




MRO Disturbance Sept. 18, 2007



Actual Aug. 4, 2007 Frequency



Governor Modeling




Shakespearean generation

- How can I trip thee, let me count the ways

In 133 system disturbances examined:

- Unexpected Gen. Turbine Control Action (35 times)
- Voltage sensitivity of gen. aux. power systems (13 generators tripped)

Newton Unit Response



- Improved and validated powerflow and dynamics models
 - Benchmarking against actual system performance
- Library of standardized component models for generators and other electrical equipment
- Composite load modeling
- Move toward node-breaker modeling
- Tie to protection setting databases
- Interaction of System Protection and Turbine Controls
- Modeling Guideline – industry technical reference

1. Generator Dynamics – Eastern Interconnection governor and exciter models are suspect
2. Load Behavior – load composition changing
Use of composite load models necessary
 - More air conditioning load
 - CFL and LED lighting – not like incandescent
 - Variable speed drives
3. Frequency Response – EI dynamics models not capable of simulating primary frequency response

4. Inter-Area Oscillations – EI models not capable of predicting
5. Equipment Modeling – lack of standardized system component models
 - Creating standardized component model library
6. Modeling Errors – data errors, wrong component models
7. Modeling Consistency – varying understanding of models and parameters

8. Model Compatibility – data exchange problems between platforms and programs
9. Approaches to Modeling – operational node-breaker models / Planning bus-line models
10. Special Protection Systems/Remedial Action Schemes – must model to predict interaction
11. Protection Systems – better modeling of protection systems needed
12. Turbine and Boiler Controls – research starting on what should be modeled



Questions?